Libya abandons Arctic Metagaz as ghost ship floats aimlessly in Mediterranean
Ship tracking websites show that the tugboat Maridive 701, which was keeping the uncrewed Russian LNG carrier, Arctic Metagaz, on tow off the eastern Libyan coast has now returned back to base in Tripoli, suggesting the ghost ship is once again adrift in the Mediterranean
26 April 2026, 7:30am by Kurt Sansone
2 min read
The Arctic Metagaz wreck was last located some 90 nautical miles off the Libya’s eastern coast before tugboat operations to keep it on tow were abandoned
The Arctic Metagaz is part of Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet” transporting fossil fuels in violation of international sanctions over Moscow’s war on Ukraine.
The tanker, carrying liquefied natural gas, was badly damaged in a suspected sea drone attack near Maltese waters earlier this month.
According to Russian authorities, it was hit and badly damaged by Ukrainian naval drones. Ukraine has not commented.
UAE announces decision to withdraw from Opec, Opec+ from May 1
After leaving Opec, the UAE will continue its responsible role by gradually and thoughtfully increasing production, in line with demand and market conditions
The decision, which comes after six decades of being a part of the organisation, was made after the nation’s production policy and its capacity was reviewed.
Roughly half of the United Arab Emirates’ daily oil exports are delivered through Fujairah, whose location on the Gulf of Oman allows the United Arab Emirates to bypass the geopolitically volatile Strait of Hormuz. Oil is delivered to Fujairah from the oil-rich emirate of Abu Dhabi through the Habshan-Fujairah oil pipeline, which began operations in 2012. In 2025 about 1.7 million barrels of crude oil were exported from Fujairah per day.
Africa could face a refined fuel shortfall of 86 million tonnes by 2040, according to a new report by the Africa Finance Corporation, which warns that recent geopolitical tensions have exposed the continent’s reliance on external energy supply routes.
Riverside, Jetty with vessels drone view. [Stock Photo/Getty Images]
Africa could face an 86 million tonne refined fuel shortfall by 2040, according to the Africa Finance Corporation.
The report warns that over 70 per cent of Africa’s fuel is imported, alongside $230 billion in essential goods annually.
Geopolitical tensions, including disruptions at the Strait of Hormuz, have exposed supply vulnerabilities.
Leaders and investors are calling for increased domestic refining capacity to reduce dependence on imports.
The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry said that earlier this month, a ship called ABINSK entered the Haifa port with wheat cargo from Russian-occupied territory. Kyiv said it alerted Israeli authorities but the vessel was allowed to unload its cargo and leave Haifa in mid-April.
It said the ship was part of the “shadow fleet” that helps prop up the Kremlin’s war economy by shipping products for countries facing international sanctions — such as Venezuela, Russia and Iran — often by concealing or spoofing their location data. They also often engage in ship-to-ship transfers of their cargo while at sea in an effort to obscure its origin.
Using data from ship-tracking website MarineTraffic, NBC News tracked the Russian-flagged Abinsk from the occupied Crimean port of Kerch on March 17 to Haifa on April 12.
The ship left Haifa on April 15, according to the tracker, and arrived at the port of Kavkaz in southern Russia on April 22. MarineTraffic doesn’t track the type of cargo aboard a ship or where it originates from.
Ukraine named the ship at the center of Tuesday’s firestorm as Panormitis. According to MarineTraffic data, the Panama-flagged ship left Russia’s Kavkaz port April 11 and arrived at Haifa on April 25. The ship is currently drifting in the area of Haifa Bay, per the tracker.
As if Iraq has not had enough trouble and strife, Wajeeh Lion Substack explains their peril to those of us who maybe, like me, were ignorant of the US Sword of Damocles held over them:
The clock has officially run out in Baghdad. As of late April 2026, Iraq has blown past its constitutional deadline to form a new government, plunging the nation into a perilous political freeze. To understand the paralysis gripping the country right now, you do not need a degree in international relations or game theory. At its core, the crisis is a high-stakes game of political chicken between two powerful men, complicated by the United States holding the country’s purse strings and Iran watching closely from the shadows.
The deadlock centers on the dominant political coalition in parliament, which had exactly fifteen days following the election of a new Iraqi president earlier this month to agree on a prime minister. That deadline came and went in total silence. The group is fundamentally paralyzed because two political heavyweights refuse to step aside. On one side is Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, the current caretaker prime minister who is determined to keep his job. On the other side is Nouri al-Maliki, a formidable former prime minister fighting aggressively for a political comeback. Neither man is willing to back down, knowing that surrendering would look like a massive public defeat. Yet, if neither yields, their political coalition risks fracturing entirely, leaving the government stuck in a constitutional void.
This is not merely a local political dispute. The United States has inserted itself forcefully into the outcome, utilizing a unique and devastating point of economic leverage. Because of how Iraq’s economy is structured, the revenue it generates from selling oil is held at the Federal Reserve in New York. To keep the Iraqi economy functioning, the U.S. Treasury physically flies pallets of U.S. dollars to Baghdad’s Central Bank. Following recent regional conflicts, the U.S. government issued a stark, public ultimatum: if Maliki is reinstated as prime minister, Washington will cut off those dollar shipments. American officials view Maliki as too closely aligned with Iran and blame his past policies for fueling regional instability. Without those regular dollar shipments, Iraq’s economy would collapse almost overnight. This puts the Iraqi political establishment in an agonizing bind. While certain factions desperately want Maliki back in power, absolutely no one wants to be responsible for bankrupting the country.
Adding fuel to the fire is the chaos unfolding just outside Iraq’s borders. Following the late-2024 collapse of the Syrian government to extremist groups, Iraqi leaders are terrified that violence will spill over their borders, mirroring the devastating invasions of a decade ago. Furthermore, Iraq remains the primary proxy battleground for influence between Washington and Tehran. While the United States threatens economic ruin from afar, Iranian generals have recently traveled to Baghdad to exert direct pressure on politicians, demanding a leader sympathetic to their interests. This intense regional anxiety makes Iraqi politicians feel an acute need for a strong, decisive leader, yet they cannot agree on who that should be without severely angering one of the competing global superpowers.
So, how do Maliki and Sudani avoid crashing the entire system? In high-stakes political standoffs, the most logical exit strategy is a compromise candidate—a third party whom neither side adores, but both can tolerate. Behind closed doors, intense negotiations are reportedly underway to elevate an independent constitutional expert and businessman named Ali Shakir Mahmoud Al-Zaidi. For the United States, Al-Zaidi is an acceptable choice simply because he is not Maliki, which would keep the crucial dollar shipments flowing. For Iran and the Iraqi coalition, he is acceptable because he remains deeply integrated within their established political network. Elevating a middle-ground figure like Al-Zaidi would allow both Maliki and Sudani to save face without triggering an economic catastrophe.
Because the stakes are so incredibly high, the Iraqi media landscape is currently flooded with disinformation designed to manipulate the negotiations and cause panic. Rumors frequently circulate that either Maliki or Sudani has secretly dropped out, or that the United States has already suspended the vital dollar shipments. In reality, both men remain officially in the race, and the Central Bank of Iraq has been forced to step in and confirm that the money is still flowing, proving the rumors were merely psychological tactics meant to force a rushed decision.
Even if a compromise is reached, the situation remains incredibly precarious. Iraq’s highest religious authority, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, possesses the power to make or break a politician with a single statement, yet he has remained notably quiet during this crisis. Furthermore, with the legal deadline now missed, the highly politicized Iraqi Supreme Court may be forced to step in to interpret the law, potentially sparking even more bitter disputes over who actually has the power to appoint the next leader. Finally, heavily armed, Iran-backed militias could still lash out with violence if they feel a compromise candidate threatens their grip on power.
For now, Iraq is holding its breath. The country’s political elite must untangle their bitter rivalries and find a workable compromise in the coming days, or they risk dragging the entire nation over an economic cliff.
King Charles and Queen Camilla arrive in the US for a four-day visit
They will have tea with President Donald Trump and first lady Melania Trump at the White House before attending a garden party. The King will address a joint meeting of Congress tomorrow.
Some Trump officials leave homes for US military bases amid political protests – report
Senior White House officials are swapping their traditional homes to live on military bases as the political climate grows more threatening.
U.S. President Joe Biden and first lady Jill Biden arrive at Fort McNair, due to the preparations on the South Lawn for the Easter Egg Roll, as they return from a weekend getaway at Camp David, in Washington, U.S., March 31, 2024.(photo credit: REUTERS/Michael A. McCoy)ByJERUSALEM POST STAFFOCTOBER 31, 2025 22:08Updated: NOVEMBER 2, 2025 00:32
Several senior Trump administration officials are living in or will soon be living in military base housing in the Washington area, The Atlantic reported on Friday.
According to the report, several US administration officials, including Stephen Miller, Marco Rubio, and Kristi Noem, have moved into houses that hosted senior military officials on bases in the Washington area to shield themselves from protests outside of their homes and political violence.
However, the number of Trump officials who have moved onto bases is now impacting housing for the nation’s top uniformed officers, as well as other administration officials.
US Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard requested earlier this year to move onto Fort McNair, but was denied based on the lack of availability.
The threat level against administration officials has changed recently, including Iranian-backed attempted assassinations, as well as the multiple assassination attempts against Trump. However, there has not been a record of this many political appointees living on military bases, the report stated.
…….. But instead of choosing homes in Georgetown, Kalorama, McLean or Great Falls, some officials in Donald Trump‘s Cabinet and among his White House staff — including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, Attorney General Pam Bondi and former Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem — are living in secure military housing, citing safety concerns. In doing so, they are embracing the literal architecture of authoritarianism.
Mali’s Defence Minister, General Sadio Camara has been killed in coordinated attacks on military sites nationwide, a government spokesperson has confirmed.
Camara was killed when assailants targeted his house, the spokesperson, Issa Ousmane Coulibaly, said in a statement on Sunday.
Camara’s residence in the garrison town of Kati came under assault on Saturday during simultaneous attacks by an al-Qaeda affiliate and Tuareg rebels.
Camara was a central figure in the military government that seized power after back-to-back coups in 2020 and 2021.
“He was one of the most influential figures within the ruling military leadership and had been seen by some as a possible future leader of Mali,” said Al Jazeera’s Nicolas Haque, who has reported extensively from Mali.
“His death is a major blow to the country’s armed forces.”
Haque said attackers carried out a suicide car bomb assault on Camara’s residence in Kati, a heavily fortified military town about 15km (9 miles) northwest of the capital, Bamako, where Interim President Assimi Goita also lives.
Camara’s second wife and two of his grandchildren were also killed in the attack on his home, the AFP news agency reported.
“Kati is considered one of the most secure locations in the country, yet fighters from the al-Qaeda-linked Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), along with Tuareg fighters from the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), were able to launch the attack”.
Goita was “alive and well in a secure location”, Haque added.
Mali Attacks Deepen Investor Risk, Threaten Gold Output and Digital Expansion
Security shock compounds regulatory pressure as miners, telecom firms and lenders reassess exposure across the Sahel
A surge in militant attacks in Mali is sharpening concerns over the country’s investment outlook, with risks spreading from its gold sector to transport networks and the fast-growing digital economy.
The latest violence, which struck strategic sites including military and transport infrastructure, highlights the reach of insurgent groups into areas critical to commerce. For investors, it reinforces a deteriorating operating environment in a country already navigating sweeping policy changes in its mining industry.
Mali is among Africa’s top gold producers, making the sector central to exports, fiscal revenue and foreign exchange inflows. Any disruption to mining operations or supply chains threatens to ripple through the broader economy, raising the prospect of production losses, shipment delays and higher security costs for companies.
The attacks come as the military leadership continue to tighten control over the sector through revised mining rules aimed at boosting state participation. The combination of regulatory overhaul and escalating insecurity is creating a high-risk environment, where capital allocation decisions will be done more cautiously and, in some cases, delayed.
Transport and trade flows are also exposed. As a landlocked economy, Mali depends heavily on regional corridors to move goods. Disruptions linked to insecurity can quickly translate into higher logistics costs, delays at borders and pressure on import-dependent sectors.
London-listed Endeavour Mining (EDV.L) has announced, along with two other gold producers, their agreement to transition to Mali’s new mining code, according to government officials.
This code, which increases taxes and aims to transfer significant ownership of mining assets to the state, has led to intense conflicts with mining companies since its implementation in August 2023, contributing to a 23% decline in Mali’s gold production last year, totaling 51 metric tons.
On state television late Monday, Finance Minister Alousseni Sanou and the Minister of Mines revealed a new memorandum of understanding with Somika SA – an entity that is 80% owned by Endeavour and 20% by the Malian government – along with Faboula Gold and Bagama Mining.
The specifics of the agreements were not made public.
The three companies represent just a small portion of Mali’s gold production, with Faboula and Bagama commencing their output in 2021, each contributing 500 kg, while the Kalana project managed by Somika has yet to initiate production.
Since the adoption of the mining code, all three have been mostly inactive.
Somika’s director, Abdoul Aziz, stated that the construction of the mine “will commence six months following the agreement’s signing, with production expected to begin 18 months thereafter.”
“Somika is projected to operate for 10 years, generating an annual revenue of 135 billion CFA francs ($238.9 million).
In contrast, Bagama and Faboula are each anticipated to have five-year lifespans, with revenues of 50 billion and 75 billion CFA francs respectively,” Sanou mentioned, noting that each firm is likely to create approximately 2,000 jobs.
Endeavour Mining chose not to provide a comment. Attempts to reach Faboula Gold and Bagama Mining for their input were unsuccessful.
Mali’s largest gold producer, Barrick Mining (ABX.TO), has halted operations in the Loulo-Gounkoto complex since mid-January after the government obstructed its exports, detained several executives, and confiscated three tonnes of gold bullion.
The Canadian mining company is currently embroiled in a dispute with the government and has initiated arbitration proceedings at the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
Although Mali ranks among Africa’s leading gold producers, regulatory uncertainties have negatively impacted both investment and production.
The late pedophile appeared to confirm as much in a 2015 email that was released last month as part of a massive Epstein files dump.
In the email, Epstein attached a link to Norwegian cosmetics heiress Celina Midelfart, followed by the message: “My 20-year-old girlfriend in ’93, that after two years i gave to donald.”
Jeffrey Epstein writes in an email that
In September, the Wall Street Journal published a sexually suggestive birthday letter dedicated to Epstein that was illustrated and signed by Trump. The message, encased in a doodle of a woman’s body, made several references to a “wonderful secret” the two of them shared.
Les Wexner had been bank rolling Jeffrey Epstein since 1987 as his ‘financial manager’.
1996
Annie and Maria Farmer
Epstein victim’s sister reported him in 1996 but FBI failed to investigate, files show
Maria Farmer testified at 2021 trial of Ghislaine Maxwell, the accomplice of the dead paedophile financier
Annie Farmer was abused by Epstein and Ghislaine Maxwell at age 16. Photograph: Gabriele Holtermann/PA
Victoria Bekiempis
Sun Dec 21 2025 – 20:25•5 MIN READ
While US president Donald Trump’s justice department did not deliver on a legal requirement to disclose all Jeffrey Epstein-related files by Friday, one document in an otherwise underwhelming disclosure lifted the veil on authorities’ inaction – and its dire consequences for dozens of teen girls.
That document is an FBI report from Maria Farmer, a painter who worked for Epstein around 1996.
Farmer, whose sister Annie Farmer was abused by Epstein and his accomplice Ghislaine Maxwell at age 16, told authorities in 1996 that the late financier “stole” nude images of her siblings.
Farmer reported Epstein’s behaviour with photographs, but the FBI has never openly recognised that she made such a report, according to the New York Times. The newspaper also noted how an internal investigation into the justice department’s handling of Epstein’s case did not mention this report.
April 11, 2026 New Mexico investigative journalist broke this news:
Breaking News Exclusive: The U.S. Attorney Who Should Have Investigated Jeffrey Epstein for Sexually Abusing 16-Year-Old Annie Farmer in 1996 in New Mexico Was Epstein’s Personal POA for Zorro Ranch.
Former U.S. attorney for the District of New Mexico John J. Kelly was Epstein’s personal Power of Attorney on Zorro Ranch matters. This has never been publicly disclosed until now.
That former federal prosecutor was John J. Kelly, a prominent attorney in Albuquerque, New Mexico who served as the U.S. attorney for the District of New Mexico from 1993 to 2000. In 2024, Kelly was asked by a local news outlet why his contact information appeared in Epstein’s contact directory, often referred to as Epstein’s “little black book.”
On July 8, 2012, King announced on an Albuquerque radio show that he would seek the Democratic nomination for governor in 2014. He challenged first-term incumbent governor Susana Martinez (R) for the office. He ran twice previously for the governorship, in 1998 and 2002, losing the first in the primary and dropping out in the second.[3] King lost in the general election on November 4, 2014.
Immediately after graduating from law school, King formed his own private practice law firm, King & Stanley, based in Moriarty, New Mexico. Six years later, he assumed the dual roles of corporate general counsel and senior environment scientist for Advanced Sciences, Inc., an environmental consulting firm. In 1998, King was appointed as the policy advisor to the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management at the United States Department of Energy (DOE) in Washington, D.C. Within a year’s time, he became Director of the Office of Worker and Community Transition. During his time at the DOE, he developed and implemented a program fostering cooperation between federal, state, local and Native American governments to enhance cleanup activities.
Gary King’s father, Bruce, who sold the Zorro Ranch to Epstein, was researched by Daniel Greenfield – see above link.
Here is an extract:
Former Gov. Bruce King had been a power player in the state from the 50s through the 90s. During his final years in office, Gov. King sold what would become the Zorro Ranch to Jeffrey Epstein for $12 million. The deal with the governor gave Epstein his own compound, airstrip, and grazing rights around it, to keep Zorro as isolated as possible, allowing him to fly in guests and girls with no questions.
The sale was stranger still because the land around the Zorro Ranch, where Epstein would reportedly hold lavish parties featuring major New Mexico political figures, and bring teenage girls there to abuse, went on belonging to the King family.
Unlike New York and Florida, Epstein had no ties to New Mexico and no obvious reason to build a compound there. Santa Fe was much farther from the action than Palm Beach or Manhattan. But Epstein didn’t just buy land from anyone, he bought it from the man running the state longer than anyone else and a member of the most influential family in the state. Shortly after the governor left office, his son, Gary King, already a state legislator, went to work under Bill Richardson, the state’s future governor, before going on to become New Mexico’s Attorney General.
Jeffrey Epstein provided sizable donations to both Gary King and Bill Richardson. When the first phase of the Epstein scandal broke, Gary King was forced to return $15,000 in donations from the notorious sex predator. “I don’t think I’ve ever met him personally. He knows other members of my family better,” King claimed.
Look back to pre 2016, Conchita Sarnoff’s book, TrafficKing:
TrafficKing
TrafficKing yanks back the curtain on an underworld where children pay the ultimate price as victims. The story explores the darkest recesses of the corridors of power, from Harvard to the White House. Conchita Sarnoff, an investigative journalist, who despite bribes to stay silent, risked her life to expose the brutal reality of human trafficking and the Jeffrey E. Epstein case. Epstein, at the center of the saga, is a pedophile billionaire and Wall Street hedge fund manager and registered level-3 sex offender. It is a child sex trafficking story of epic proportions and the longest running human trafficking case in U.S. legal history; more poignant than the Lewinsky Scandal, Watergate Scandal and Profumo Affair combined. His team of attorneys included: Alan Dershowitz, Kenneth Starr, Roy Black and Gerald Lefcourt. HRH Prince Andrew, former President Bill Clinton, Alan Dershowitz and others were implicated in the case. A decade after Epstein’s arrest, Virginia Roberts Giuffre vs. Ghislaine Maxwell is pending, along with two more related cases. It’s a tug of war between lust and power and decency and human rights. The revelations in this book could have serious implications in the upcoming 2016 Presidential elections.
An updated mapping by OCHA shows 925 movement obstacles across the West Bank, including East Jerusalem – the highest number recorded in the past 20 years and 43 per cent above the two-decade average.
Since January 2023, 45 Palestinian communities have been fully displaced across the West Bank due to settler attacks and related access restrictions, including nine communities in 2026.
In Gaza, two years of escalated hostilities caused development to leap back by an estimated 77 years, a new European Union and United Nations assessment finds.
While major impediments persist, aid entry into Gaza surged considerably between 14 and 20 April, compared with the previous week, attributable, inter alia, to the reopening of Zikim Crossing.
Two UNICEF contractors killed while delivering drinking water in northern Gaza, prompting the suspension of operations at a key filling point.
Overview
Across the Occupied Palestinian Territory, people continue to face acute protection, access and humanitarian challenges driven by systemic violence, movement restrictions and the erosion of essential services. Recurrent attacks affecting civilians – including children, aid workers and service providers – drive and sustain displacement and further heighten risks to Palestinians’ safety and wellbeing, particularly for displaced communities, women, girls and others facing intersecting vulnerabilities.
In a new report covering 2025, UN Women notes that across Gaza and the West Bank, women and girls remained in urgent need of lifesaving humanitarian protection and assistance, including access to food, clean water, shelter, health care, and education. It warns that women and girls continue to face heightened risks of gender-based violence – particularly older women, those with disabilities or caring for family members with disabilities. The report links those risks to repeated displacement, overcrowded and unsafe living conditions, resource scarcity and the collapse of family and community protective networks. All the while, the report warns, access to services that prevent or respond to gender-based violence remain critically limited. A separate report by the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) warns of harmful coping mechanisms, including child marriage, across the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In Gaza, UNFPA warns that such practices are on the rise, accompanied by a surge in adolescent pregnancies.
In the West Bank, sexualized and gender-based violence is occurring “within a coercive environment that contributes to the forcible transfer of Palestinian communities,” according to a recent report by the West Bank Protection Consortium. Communities have reported a “broader pattern of sexualized harassment, intimidation and humiliation, much of which remains underreported,” including conduct that takes “sexualized and gendered forms.” In this context, “more than 70% of displaced households identified threats to women and children, particularly sexualized violence, as the decisive reason for leaving,” highlighting its role as a key driver of displacement. The report further notes that such violence “penetrates domestic space, fractures family life and renders continued civilian residence untenable,” reinforcing the cumulative pressures that lead families to leave their communities.
West Bank
During the reporting period, between 14 and 20 April, schools reopened for in-person learning across the West Bank and students have resumed classroom attendance after nearly one month of disrupted schooling due to the regional escalation. While some students were able to access remote learning during this period, significant learning time has been lost, according to the Education Cluster. A key challenge remains supporting children to readjust to structured, in-person learning routines after an extended period of remote education. This transition is affecting attendance, engagement, and overall continuity of learning, particularly for younger students and those who faced limited access to remote modalities.
Educational materials lie scattered on the ground following the demolition of a donor-funded Palestinian school by Israeli settlers in the northern Jordan Valley. Photo by OCHA
Casualties and Settler Attacks
Between 14 and 20 April, Israeli forces shot and killed two Palestinians, including one child, in two separate incidents in Jerusalem and Hebron governorates. The first occurred on 16 April during a raid by Israeli forces in Beit Duqqu village in Jerusalem governorate. The second took place on 18 April near an Israeli settlement in Hebron governorate; according to Israeli forces, the man was inside the Israeli settlement with a knife. The bodies of both Palestinians have been withheld by Israeli authorities.
Outside the reporting period of this section, on 22 April, Israeli settlers shot and killed a Palestinian man during a settler attack in Deir Dibwan town, in Ramallah governorate. On 21 April, four Palestinian fatalities, including two children, were reported. A Palestinian woman died of injuries sustained in 2023 during an Israeli forces’ operation in Jenin Camp. In Al Mughayyir village, in Ramallah governorate, an Israeli settler opened fire toward the village near the school, killing a Palestinian child and injuring two others. Israeli forces subsequently arrived and fired live ammunition, tear gas canisters, and sound grenades. Another Palestinian man was shot and killed by Israeli settlers near the school. In another incident on 21 April, a Palestinian boy died in a road traffic incident at Beit ‘Einun junction on Road 60 in Hebron governorate after being struck by a vehicle belonging to an Israeli security unit, reportedly securing a ministerial convoy; Israeli police opened an investigation (not counted among the overall number of fatalities by Israeli forces or settlers).
During the same reporting period, at least 55 Palestinians, including nine children, were injured, including 31 by Israeli settlers in settler attacks and 24 by Israeli forces mainly within the context of search operations and other raids by Israeli forces. More than half of Palestinians injured by Israeli settles or forces during settler attacks (18 out 34) were reported in a single incident in Halhul town, in Hebron governorate. During this incident, dozens of Israeli settlers attacked Palestinian farmers while they were working on their land. Israeli settlers physically assaulted Palestinians, used pepper spray, and stole agricultural tools. Israeli forces arrived at the scene, declared the area a closed military zone, and detained about 120 Palestinians, later releasing most of them.
Between 14 and 20 April, OCHA documented at least 37 Israeli settler attacks against Palestinians that resulted in casualties, property damage, or both, bringing the total number of attacks since the beginning of 2026 to about 680 in over 200 communities. This is an average of six incidents per day. During the reporting period, more than 260 Palestinian-owned trees and saplings and 14 vehicles, including an ambulance, were vandalized, and water pipes were damaged. In addition, at least 170 Palestinian-owned livestock were reportedly stolen by Israeli settlers from two communities in Ramallah governorate.
On 20 April, students in Umm al Khair community, in Hebron governorate, protested after Israeli settlers had blocked the main access route to the local school with a metal fence on 13 April, leaving only an unsafe alternative route passing near a settlement outpost. When students and families previously attempted to access the school, Israeli forces accompanying settlers fired tear gas canisters toward them, affecting 55 students, including 23 girls, who suffered tear gas inhalation and acute stress symptoms; no cases were referred for medical treatment. According to the Education Cluster, the incident highlights children’s exposure to the use of force by Israeli forces and settlers near schools and ongoing risks to safe access to education. In response, three education partners are delivering coordinated support to affected children, including psychosocial services. Education cash assistance for transportation has commenced and will continue through the end of the academic year. The distribution of recreational kits, stationery, and school bags also continues.
Arson attacks by Israeli settlers continued during the reporting period (14-20 April), affecting Palestinian homes, vehicles and agricultural livelihoods across multiple communities. In at least five incidents, settlers set fire to residential structures, including parts of a multi-storey home, agricultural land and assets, resulting in damage to at least two homes, destruction of crops cultivated on several dunums, and the loss of key livelihood items such as equipment, tents and vehicles. An ambulance travelling on a main road was also damaged after settlers threw flammable materials at it.
Access to Water
According to the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Cluster, access to water and sanitation services across the West Bank remains constrained due to ongoing settler violence, movement restrictions, demolitions, and damage to infrastructure, particularly in the northern West Bank, Masafer Yatta in Hebron governorate, and other herding communities residing in Area C. These conditions continue to disrupt access of Palestinians to water sources, damage networks and storage structures, and limit service delivery, increasing reliance on short-term interventions such as water trucking.
So far in 2026, Israeli settlers have vandalized over 60 WASH structures and infrastructure, including pipelines, irrigation systems and water tanks, undermining access to water in 32 Palestinian communities.
The impact of these incidents on herding and farming communities is especially acute. For example, on 12 April, Israeli settlers bulldozed at least 300 metres of a main water network near Khirbet ‘Atuf, in Tubas governorate in the northern Jordan Valley, cutting off water supply to more than 20 Palestinian families in the eastern ‘Atuf and Ras al-Ahmar communities. The damage also affected the livelihoods of about 120 farmers in eastern ‘Atuf and 300 farmers in Al-Ras al-Ahmar whose lands are located east of the newly constructed trench, with water supply disconnected for at least 48 hours. Also in the northern Jordan Valley, Israeli settlers continue to destroy water pipelines connected to Ein el Himma Spring in Khirbet Tell el Himma community and restrict the access of Palestinian herders and farmers to the area through physical assaults and intimidation. In Masafer Yatta, water supply to 11 communities has been disrupted since late January, when settlers reportedly interfered with the main transmission pipeline, cutting off access, and was followed by repeated acts of sabotage against the network. In March, efforts to restore water access through the provision of spare parts to service providers enabled the temporary reconnection of a damaged main pipeline. However, the pipeline was reportedly damaged again within 12 hours, resulting in renewed disruption of supply and continued reliance on emergency water trucking.
To mitigate the impact of these violent incidents, WASH Cluster partners continue to implement a range of emergency and resilience-focused interventions. In March, 10 partners reached about 29,500 internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other crisis-affected people across 73 communities with emergency interventions while continuing to explore more sustainable solutions where access permits. Key interventions included: delivering 2,528 cubic metres of water through trucking; installing or rehabilitating 6,864 metres of water networks; providing 636 water storage tanks; rehabilitating 23 cisterns; installing or repairing 157 latrines; desludging 1,660 cubic metres of wastewater; and distributing 338 hygiene kits.
Displacement
During the reporting period, between 14 and 20 April, OCHA triggered emergency response to the demolition of 40 Palestinian-owned structures, including 14 homes, for lacking Israeli-issued building permits, which are nearly impossible for Palestinians to obtain. These included 33 structures in Area C, displacing five families of 23 people, including 15 children, and seven structures (all homes) demolished by their owners in East Jerusalem, displacing 35 people, including 11 children.
Just over half of the structures (17) and all displacement (23 people) in Area C were in the community of Az Za’ayyem Bedouins in the Jerusalem governorate. Az Za’ayyem Bedouin is among 18 communities of over 4,000 people residing in an area designated for the E1 settlement plan in eastern Jerusalem governorate by Israeli authorities to create a continuous built-up area between Ma’ale Adumim settlement and Jerusalem.
In addition, a Palestinian family of eight people, including three children, was displaced on 14 April in a herding community in Hebron governorate, due to recurrent settler attacks. Settler attacks have accounted for about 75 per cent of displacement across the West Bank in 2026, further intensifying the coercive environment and heightening the risk of forcible transfer.
In another incident (outside the reporting period), on 21 April, Israeli settlers, believed to be from a newly-established settlement outpost near Tayasir checkpoint in Tubas governorate in the northern Jordan Valley, raided the Hammamat al Maleh community, and demolished at least two residential structures and an elementary, donor-funded school that served approximately 60 children from surrounding herding communities. In addition, the last three remaining Palestinian households in the community, comprising 15 people including six children, were fully displaced. This is one of six communities that have been fully displaced in Tubas governorate since 2023 due to settler attacks and access restrictions.
Since January 2023, 116 communities across the West Bank have experienced full or partial displacement due to settler attacks and related access restrictions, predominantly in Bedouin and herding communities in Area C. These include 45 communities comprising over 3,500 people that have been fully displaced, including 14 communities in 2023 (10 of them in the aftermath of 7 October), 10 in 2024, 12 in 2025 and nine so far in 2026. In total, more than 5,800 Palestinians have been displaced within this context, including about 1,960 people in 2026.
Access and Movement Restrictions
On 23 April, OCHA released the findings of a field survey conducted in December 2025, where it documented 925 movement obstacles that permanently or intermittently restrict the movement of 3.4 million Palestinians across the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. This is 43 per cent more than the annual average of 647 movement obstacles in the preceding 20 years. Checkpoints and road gates comprise nearly 60 per cent of movement obstacles, signaling the increasing entrenchment of movement restrictions. Combined with the long-standing impact of the Barrier and its associated regime, movement restrictions continue to undermine Palestinians’ access to essential services, such as health care and education.
On at least three occasions in March 2026, Israeli forces installed movement obstacles across Nablus, Salfit, and Tubas governorates, disrupting access to services, homes, and livelihoods. In Al Lubban ash Sharqiya in Nablus governorate, Israeli forces blocked with cement blocks a road that affected students’ vehicular access to schools in the area. In Deir Ballut in Salfit governorate, a roadblock restricted the movement of four families to their homes. In Khirbet ‘Atuf in Tubas governorate, Israeli forces installed two gates that forced 32 families in the area to rely on less accessible routes to reach their homes, essential services and farmland.
Further details on key incidents in the West Bank are provided in Annex 2.
For key figures and additional breakdowns of casualties, displacement and settler violence between January 2005 and March 2026, please refer to the OCHA West Bank March 2026 Snapshot.
Gaza Strip
Living conditions across the Gaza Strip remain dire, with most people still displaced, exposed to rising public health risks (see below) and ongoing strikes that cause civilian harm. Over the past week, reports of gunfire, shelling and strikes have increased significantly.
Data by the Ministry of Health (MoH) in Gaza indicates that between 15 and 21 April, 18 Palestinians were killed, three died of wounds, one body was retrieved, and 79 people were injured. This brings the overall reported casualty toll since the announcement of the ceasefire on 10 October 2025 to 786 fatalities and 2,217 injuries. Another 196 fatalities were retroactively added to the total number after their identification details were approved by MoH.
Aid workers and other providers of critical services have not been spared. On 17 April, during routine work to deliver drinking water to displaced communities, two civilian contractors operating on behalf of UNICEF were killed, and two others were injured. In a statement, UNICEF said the contractors were killed by Israeli fire at the Mansoura drinking water filling station in northern Gaza.
In a separate statement, the Humanitarian Country Team of the Occupied Palestinian Territory condemned the killing, reminded the obligation set in international humanitarian law to protect civilians, and called for immediate measures to ensure the safety of civilians and humanitarian operations.
The incident forced UNICEF to suspend water collection at that location until security conditions are restored. Since that was the primary operational filling point from the Mekorot water pipeline from Israel, serving Gaza city, mitigation measures were critical; partners have therefore increased water collection from alternative sources, including private desalination plants.
On 20 April, the European Union and the United Nations released the final Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, jointly concluded with the World Bank. The assessment finds that over 24 months of escalated hostilities caused catastrophic levels of infrastructure damage and destruction, with the total recovery and reconstruction needs estimated at US$71.4 billion over the next decade. Physical infrastructure damage is assessed at $35.2 billion, alongside $22.7 billion in economic and social losses, with housing, health, education, commerce and agriculture among the hardest hit sectors. According to the new assessment, over 370,000 housing units and nearly all schools have been destroyed or damaged, more than half of hospitals are non functional, and Gaza’s economy has contracted by 84 per cent. Overall, human development in Gaza is assessed to have leaped back by 77 years. The authors of the report call for recovery efforts to run in parallel with humanitarian response and to be Palestinian led and aligned with UN Security Council Resolution 2803.
Pests, rodents and public health
Aid workers applying pest-control measures at a displacement site in Gaza. Photo by UNRWA
Vector-borne risks linked to the proximity of solid waste accumulation to displacement sites remain high. Rodents, cockroaches, flies, and other pests are proliferating and contributing to the spread of disease. Between 14 and 19 April, the Site Management Cluster coordinated fumigation across 21 designated emergency shelters and 30 nearby displacement sites in Rafah and Khan Younis, benefiting approximately 35,000 people (6,950 families). Fumigation activities in Khan Younis have been completed, while implementation in Rafah is ongoing. The Israeli authorities have approved the import of essential pesticides, insecticides, and equipment to support implementation of the plan. Other interventions are ongoing.
Between 14 and 20 April, according to UN 2720 Mechanism data retrieved at 19:00 on 23 April, approximately 17,400 pallets of UN and partners’ aid were offloaded at the Kerem Shalom and Zikim crossings. Of these supplies, nearly 70 per cent consisted of food assistance, followed by shelter items (24 per cent), health supplies (3 per cent), nutrition supplies (2 per cent), and WASH supplies (1 per cent). This marks a significant increase compared with the previous week, when about 7,400 pallets were offloaded, attributable, inter alia, to the reopening of Zikim Crossing for collections on 13 April.
During the same period, nearly 12,900 pallets of UN and partners’ aid were collected for onward distribution inside Gaza, compared with about 9,200 pallets the previous week.
At Ashdod Port, scanning capacity remains limited, with only 40 to 60 aid containers scanned per day – below the communicated and desirable target of between 80 and 100. Overall, between 14 and 19 April, only 48 per cent of UN and partner truckloads manifested via Ashdod offloaded at Kerem Shalom or Zikim due a low scanning throughout. The offloading rate via Egypt remained stable at 73 per cent, while 91 per cent of the trucks manifested from Israel (excluding Ashdod port) and 100 per cent of those from the West Bank offloaded at Kerem Shalom.
The Logistics Cluster has expanded common storage capacity inside Gaza to over 15,500 square metres across 12 warehouses, strengthening partners’ ability to manage incoming supplies.
All data presented so far in this section, on incoming supplies, refers to humanitarian cargo tracked by the UN 2720 mechanism; as such, it does not include bilateral donations and the commercial sector.
With regards to the commercial sector, data shared by the Gaza Chamber of Commerce with the Cash Working Group suggests that between 13 and 19 April, a total of 843 truckloads of commercial goods were collected into the Strip – more than double the quantity collected the week prior. Of the 843 trucks, the majority comprised food supplies, 75 carried shelter items, 52 hygiene supplies, 25 cooking gas and one solid fuel, while over 23 per cent comprised items classified as “other,” including soft drinks, biscuits, chips, noodles, spices, jellies and sweets, instant coffee, nuts, chocolate-hazelnut spread, flavored milk, caramel cream and breadcrumbs.
Prices have started declining, indicating a market correction since the spikes registered at the beginning of the regional escalation when all crossings were temporarily closed. However, they remain significantly higher than prior to October 2023 levels, and elevated even compared with the period between the 10 October 2025 ceasefire declaration and the beginning of the regional escalation on 28 February 2026.
For a detailed account of the latest humanitarian operations in Gaza, see Annex 1 below.
Fuel Supply
Between 16 and 21 April, UNOPS facilitated the entry of just over 500,000 litres of diesel into Gaza and distributed over 800,000 litres (including from stocks that entered before that period) in support of humanitarian operations.
Annex 1: Humanitarian Operations in the Gaza Strip by Cluster
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This section covers 14 to 19 April unless otherwise specified.
Food Security
Between 1 and 19 April, Food Security partners provided general food assistance at the household level to more than 154,000 families (approximately 600,000 people) as part of the April monthly distribution cycle. Each family received two parcels, one 25-kilogram flour bag and 2.5 kilograms of high energy biscuits, covering 75 per cent of minimum caloric needs. Additional caloric needs are covered through other modalities.
As of 15 April, partners continued to prepare and serve almost 1.14 million meals every day through 122 kitchens. This includes 799,000 daily meals produced in northern Gaza and 830,000 meals in the south. Partners are working to focus more on delivery to hard-to-reach and underserved areas. Compared with late March, daily meal production has decreased by 24 per cent, largely due to the scale-down of some partners’ activities in light of the diversification of aid modalities for the sector.
Every day, at least 290 metric tons of bread, representing 35 per cent of the estimated bread needs in the Gaza Strip, are produced with the support of Food Security partners. This bread is either distributed free of charge or sold at subsidized prices across the Strip. Production is carried out in collaboration with more than 30 commercial bakeries, as well as partners’ own baking facilities and community ovens.
Food Security partners, as well as bilateral government actors, continue distributing flour to enable families to bake bread at home. However, to sustainably improve bread availability across the Strip, humanitarian-supported bread production and flour distribution alone are insufficient. Commercial flour must be allowed to enter Gaza at scale to enable commercial bakeries to produce bread for sale on the local market.
Another round of animal feed distribution began on 15 April. As of 18 April, approximately 1,100 of the 2,200 targeted herders had been assisted, each receiving three 50-kilogram bags of feed, while distributions are ongoing.
Nutrition
Between 1 and 15 April, based on initial partner reporting, Nutrition Cluster partners screened 40,819 children aged 6–59 months for acute malnutrition, of whom 1,580 (four per cent) were admitted for treatment. This includes 261 children (0.64 per cent) diagnosed with severe acute malnutrition (SAM).
During the same timeframe, 34 children aged 6–59 months were admitted to stabilization centres for the treatment of SAM with medical complications, alongside 39 infants under six months of age at risk of poor growth, while 924 other infants were newly enrolled to receive ready-to-use infant formula.
Between 1 and 15 April, partners screened 30,358 pregnant and breastfeeding women (PBW), of whom 997 (three per cent) were admitted for acute malnutrition treatment.
Provision of preventive nutrition services continued at scale. From 1 and 15 April, partners supported 6,436 malnourished PBW through the targeted supplementary feeding programme, while blanket supplementary feeding reached 86,323 children aged 6–59 months and 30,647 PBW with medium-quantity lipid-based nutrient supplements. These were delivered through a network of 281 active distribution sites.
Some 30,886 PBW and other caregivers received either group or individual counselling on infant and young child feeding in emergencies.
Health
As of 17 April, 273 health service points, representing just above 43 per cent of all mapped facilities functional prior to October 2023, were operational across the Gaza Strip, the majority only partially. These include 19 hospitals, 13 field hospitals, 117 primary health-care centres and 124 medical points. Geographically, services availability is highest in Deir al Balah (92), followed by Gaza governorate (86), Khan Younis (79), North Gaza (10), and Rafah (6).
Service delivery remained high, with health partners providing an average of approximately 276,000 consultations per week between 1 and 21 April, up from around 271,000 per week in March, indicating sustained demand despite ongoing operational constraints.
Total water production in Gaza has remained stable, despite reduced supply through the Deir al Balah (Bani Saeed) Mekorot line from Israel and low production from the Deir al Balah Seawater Desalination Plant (short-term and low volume plant).
Critical concerns remain regarding energy availability for water production. Shortages of fuel, lubricating oil, consumables, and spare parts pose a serious risk of shutdown for critical generators that provide life-saving water services across Gaza.
On WASH operations addressing health risks associated with pests and rodents, see a dedicated section above.
Shelter
Between 14 and 19 April, Shelter Cluster partners provided life-saving shelter and NFI assistance through in-kind and voucher-based modalities to 9,120 households across the Gaza Strip. Distributions included 1,592 tarpaulins, 2,907 bedding kits, 179 sealing-off kits, 9,742 mattresses, eight kitchen sets, as well as 798 clothing kits delivered through cash and voucher assistance.
Partners continued supporting households affected by the March rainfall through the Rapid Joint Distribution Mechanism, providing 570 families with emergency shelter and essential household items, including 315 tarpaulins and 465 clothing kits.
The Shelter Cluster finalized and published the Social Vulnerability Scoring Tool, developed jointly with the Protection Cluster, to strengthen prioritization based on intersectional vulnerabilities and complement technical shelter assessments.
Pipeline constraints due to administrative impediments continue to significantly limit the response, with delays in the approval of critical materials such as solar lights, timber for framing kits, and tools. These items are essential to scale up priority interventions, including shelter repairs, upgrades of makeshift structures, and support to early recovery efforts.
Between 14 and 19 April, partners offered protection services to almost 14,000 people. Services expanded gradually across displacement sites, particularly in North Gaza, using a mix of fixed-site support, shelters, community spaces, and mobile outreach to adapt to access and security constraints. Mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) remained a core focus, reaching over 5,000 people through psychological first aid (PFA), support groups, and counseling. Specialized case management assisted more than 120 people with complex needs. Partners provided disability-inclusive services such as assistive device provisions and safe space programming to over 450 people, and legal assistance to more than 400, while community engagement activities to sensitize households on protection risks reached over 600 people through safe spaces and outreach initiatives.
Protection-linked intersectoral assistance continued during the reporting period, with approximately 580 households receiving cash assistance, more than 1,800 received relief and in-kind distributions, and over 1,700 received vouchers to purchase clothing. These interventions reflect the integration of protection services with material assistance to address immediate needs and reduce exposure to protection risks.
As part of the response for Palestinian returnees through Egypt, the Protection Desk team in Khan Younis supported 337 returnees between 14 and 19 April, bringing the total number of returnees assisted since the reopening of the Rafah Crossing on 2 February to 1,545.
Protection monitoring activities continued, with partners conducting 20 focus group discussions and 200 key informant interviews across 15 neighbourhoods, reaching approximately 2,320 people. Findings indicate that protection risks remain driven by deteriorating shelter conditions, unsafe WASH facilities, and increasing barriers to accessing food and essential services, particularly for elderly people and persons with disabilities.
Between 14 and 19 April, child protection partners provided about 10,000 children and caregivers with structured group MHPSS sessions, individual counselling, mind-body therapy, expressive arts, recreational and resilience-building activities, speech therapy, and family-based psychosocial support. In addition, over 500 people received specialized counselling and consultations, including PFA and targeted support for high-risk children.
Over 320 children facing heightened protection risks received targeted case management support, including identification, assessment, and referrals to specialized services such as health and education.
Over 7,000 children received in-kind assistance, including hygiene kits, clothing, and recreational kits to support well-being and engagement. At least 50 children received child protection cash or voucher assistance, provided as targeted support to address urgent protection needs and reduce reliance on negative coping mechanisms, such as child marriage and child labour.
Community-based explosive ordnance risk education reached more than 5,700 people, while child protection awareness sessions benefited over 1,600 people. Activities also included parenting sessions, safety messaging, youth engagement initiatives, child safety walks, and safety mapping exercises, with at least 100 children participating in structured activities to identify and mitigate protection risks within displacement settings.
Addressing Gender-Based Violence (GBV)
Between 14 and 19 April, partners addressing Gender-Based Violence (GBV) focused on capacity-building activities. These included a workplan review and validation workshop with 48 participants from 33 organizations, a one-day Case Management Task Force session with 19 members from 10 organizations on managing complex GBV cases, and three two-day trainings on MHPSS and GBV, reaching over 60 participants in Gaza city, Deir al Balah, and Khan Younis.
The GBV Area of Responsibility delivered a session to Food Security Sector members on identifying GBV risks within food assistance activities.
In terms of service delivery, partners reached over 10,000 people through 68 women and girls’ safe spaces, two designated emergency shelters, and 11 additional service delivery points across the Strip. Services included group MHPSS sessions, individual GBV case management with cash for protection assistance, and dignity kit distributions. Several cases were identified through hotlines and referrals from other sectors. Partners reported an increase in GBV incidents in displacement sites, including life threatening physical violence. Women and girls remain highly vulnerable due to economic stress, displacement, and poor living conditions at the sites.
Regarding emerging needs, partners reported high demand from women and girls for economic empowerment and psychosocial support activities. Ongoing challenges include movement restrictions affecting frontline service providers and people in need, as well as the high cost of materials required to facilitate activities in women and girls’ safe spaces.
Mine Action
Between 14 and 19 April, partners conducted 104 explosive hazard assessments in support of debris removal and other partner activities, and six emergency response team missions.
Explosive ordnance risk education activities continued between 9 and 16 April, reaching almost 11,900 people in Gaza city, Deir al Balah and Khan Younis.
Between 14 and 19 April, the incident tracking database recorded one accident that involved explosive ordnance, leading to one Palestinian killed. Since the beginning of the year, 21 accidents have been recorded, leading to 36 Palestinians injured and four killed.
Education
Between 14 and 19 April, partners distributed 212 cartons of school supplies across eight temporary learning spaces (TLSs) – two in Deir al Balah and six in North Gaza – benefiting 8,480 children. In addition, education partners provided early childhood development kits to two TLSs in Deir al Balah, supporting 350 pre-school children, while 450 children received recreational kits to promote structured play activities.
To expand access to learning, partners installed 36 high-performance tents across six TLSs – two in accessible areas of Rafah and four in southern Khan Younis. These improved learning spaces are expected to increase student attendance, as they offer better protection from harsh weather, particularly with the onset of summer heat.
Despite these efforts, access to learning materials remains severely constrained. Since 11 April, no educational supplies have entered Gaza. Combined with overcrowded learning spaces and limited instructional time, these constraints are exacerbating learning poverty, with many enrolled children unable to acquire foundational skills, including reading and comprehension.
Funding shortfalls continue to limit the expansion of learning opportunities, including the provision of teacher incentives and remuneration, which are essential to scaling up education services.
Access to water within TLSs is becoming increasingly problematic. Limited water storage capacity continues to adversely affect the learning environment and overall conditions within these spaces.
The Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC), in partnership with the Palestinian NGO Network, launched the Humanitarian Hub Connectivity Portal, improving humanitarian access to internet connectivity, particularly in northern Gaza. In addition, the ETC contributed to and coordinated the rollout of Radio Insan (First Response Radio) across several coordination platforms.
Annex 2: Key Incidents in the West Bank, 14-20 April 2026
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On 14 April, a Palestinian family of eight, including three children, was forcibly displaced from their community near Ad Dhahiriya, in Hebron governorate, after being subjected to repeated harassment and threats by Israeli settlers believed to be from a nearby settlement outpost, leaving behind their residential shelters and animal structures.
On 14 April, Israeli settlers attacked Palestinian families in Khirbet al Marajem community near Duma village in Nablus governorate. According to the local community sources, a group of armed settlers attacked two houses, broke the security camera, electricity cable, and water pipes. There were no injuries reported.
On 16 April, Israeli forces killed and withheld the body of a Palestinian child during a five-hour raid by Israeli forces in Beit Duqqu village, in Jerusalem governorate, where they closed the village’s entrances. Palestinians threw stones and Israeli forces fired live ammunition, sound and tear gas canisters. Two Palestinians were injured, including the child, who was taken into Israeli custody and later pronounced dead. Three Palestinians were arrested.
On 17 April, Israeli settlers believed to be from an Israeli settlement outpost nearby attacked houses in Asira al Qibliya village, in Nablus governorate. Settlers threw inflammable material at a three-story house, partially damaging and burning the storage door and an electric generator, and set fire to two parked vehicles.
On 17 April, Israeli settlers attacked a Palestinian house in Beitin village, in Ramallah governorate, injuring an elderly Palestinian man and causing property damage. According to local sources, a group of Israeli settlers broke into a house at the entrance of the village and assaulted the elderly couple residing there. The man was beaten with sticks and stones, sustaining chest and leg injuries, including fractures. Settlers also damaged two windows, destroyed a cement-block wall surrounding the house, and threw stones at a family-owned parked vehicle, damaging its windshield.
On 18 April, Israeli forces killed and withheld the body of a Palestinian man near the Israeli settlement of Negohot, in Hebron governorate. Israeli forces stated that the man was inside the Israeli settlement with a knife.
On 18 April, Israeli settlers set fire to a Palestinian house, burned a vehicle, and damaged another house during an attack in Turmusa’yya village, in Ramallah governorate. According to local sources, Israeli settlers, believed to be from nearby settlement outposts, entered the outskirts of the village and threw flammable materials into an uninhabited house and a nearby parked vehicle, setting both ablaze. Later, settlers attacked another inhabited house, damaging the main gate motor and breaking two windows. They also sprayed threatening revenge graffiti on the walls of the houses. No injuries were reported.
On 19 April, Israeli settlers believed to be from Evyatar settlement outpost attempted to set fire to an ambulance near Beita town, in Nablus governorate. According to the affected paramedical staff and video footage, while the ambulance was travelling on the main road, a group of masked Israeli settlers approached it and threw flammable material and stones, damaging the windshield, one side mirror, and the front exterior of the vehicle. No injuries were reported.
On 20 April, a group of masked Israeli settlers, believed to be from Evyatar settlement outpost, attacked a Palestinian house and vandalized vehicles in Beita town, in Nablus governorate. According to local sources, some settlers, including armed individuals, entered the eastern part of the town and attacked a Palestinian house, damaging the outer gate of the yard and vandalizing a vehicle parked inside using stones and wooden sticks. Later the same day, another group of settlers entered the southern side of the town and attacked three Palestinian houses. The settlers threw stones at the houses, vandalized an electricity pole – disrupting power to approximately 10 Palestinian homes – and damaged two water connections belonging to two of the affected houses before withdrawing from the area.
** Double asterisks indicate that a figure, sentence, or section has been rectified, added, or retracted after the initial publication of this update.
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