Russian disinformation campaigns are increasingly using AI to generate deepfakes, automate fake social media accounts and amplify political divisions across Western democracies.
Operations such as Doppelganger and Storm-1516 use fabricated news websites and synthetic media to spread misleading narratives and undermine public trust.
Russian-linked networks are exploiting existing political tensions, particularly immigration, economic concerns and support for Ukraine, rather than creating entirely new political movements.
Discussions of Russian disinformation often get stuck on individual fakes or isolated campaigns. But that misses the bigger picture. Behind them sits a web of interconnected networks, built up over years, quietly shaping a global ecosystem of Russian information influence.
In late April, Bloomberg published an investigation into Storm-1516, a Russian disinformation network that the authors described as the Kremlin’s “most powerful covert weapon” in the information war. The detailed feature pointed to videos featuring actors posing as whistle-blowers, fake websites designed to mimic well-known media outlets, and anonymous influencers helping to amplify fabricated narratives. Taken together, these components form part of a broader system of information influence operations built around the large-scale distribution of false content across social media platforms worldwide.
The scale of Storm-1516’s activity is striking. In the first quarter of 2026 alone, the Microsoft Threat Analysis Center (MTAC) recorded more than 1,000 artificially generated videos produced for the network’s dissemination efforts — more than 10 fake videos a day. Over 40% of the narratives identified in these videos were aimed at undermining support for Ukraine, while roughly a third focused on interference in electoral processes in other countries. Some of the content reached audiences in the millions: a single post containing a fabricated story about Moldovan President Maia Sandu drew at least 2.3 million views and remains live on the social media platform X without any warning label indicating the content is false.
Bloomberg’s investigation traces how the ecosystem operates from the inside. Citing research by Ukrainian intelligence, the report says the network’s servers and the artificial intelligence tools used to produce its videos were financed by GRU Unit 29155, headed by Oleg Kushnir. Coordination between Storm-1516 and the hacker group Ember Bear was handled by GRU officer Yuri Khoroshenkiy. The network also received support from John Mark Dougan, a former American sheriff who now lives in Moscow. The EU sanctioned him in December 2025 for running a network of fake websites. In the same month, Russia awarded him the Medal of the Order “For Merit to the Fatherland”, ostensibly for his “fight in the information war”.
Storm-1516 operates through a well-honed three-step process. It begins with a supposed “whistle-blower” or “citizen journalist” posting a video on a newly created channel. The content is then picked up by a global network of ostensibly independent websites before being amplified by Russian émigrés, officials and sympathisers. By the time the story reaches audiences in the United States and Europe, its origins have often been obscured entirely. The scale of the operation is striking. In 2025, Storm-1516 generated more false content than RT and Sputnik combined.
In reality, this network is only the latest — and perhaps the most sophisticated — iteration of the information influence infrastructure Russia has spent years building. In an age shaped by social media, such networks have become powerful tools: emotionally charged content spreads fastest and attracts the most engagement, regardless of whether it is true, false or artificially generated.
At their core, these networks are coordinated infrastructures in which each component plays a distinct role while reinforcing the others. Content producers sit at the foundation — companies generating videos, articles and images, often with the help of actors, artificial intelligence, or even genuine writers who may not realise whose agenda they are advancing. That material is then pushed through proxy or fake media outlets, ranging from ostensibly independent publications willing to publish unverified claims to cloned versions of established media brands. These outlets give false content a veneer of legitimacy: familiar layouts and branding mean readers rarely question where it originally came from.
Next come the amplification networks — bots, purchased accounts and real users who are drawn, knowingly or not, into sharing and boosting the material. It is this layer that turns a single post into a viral narrative. At the top sits a coordination layer that sets themes, timing and objectives, while synchronising the activity of all other elements. This function can be carried out by a state body, a private contractor, or a hybrid of the two.
What sets this type of disinformation network apart from traditional propaganda is its decentralised structure and the plausible deniability it creates. Once content has moved through dozens of ostensibly independent platforms, tracing its true origin becomes extremely difficult — even for experts in media literacy.
Olgino, Internet Research Agency and first major scale-up
The first Russian structure dedicated to producing disinformation and promoting Kremlin-approved narratives was the Internet Research Agency (IRA), better known as the “troll factory” or the “Olgino trolls” — named after the location of its office, identified by journalists. The IRA’s activities were widely linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin, the late head of the Wagner Group.
The operation ran on a relatively straightforward model. Young employees were paid substantial salaries to post content and artificially boost likes and view counts. At first, the Olgino trolls mainly targeted a domestic audience, with the aim of shaping the “correct” narrative within the Russian internet. By 2014, however, after analysing the social media pages of American activist groups, they began creating fake profiles designed to imitate real members of those communities. This approach not only obscured the true origins of the content but also allowed operators to embed themselves within existing networks of civic activism.
According to the US Senate, by 2015 the agency had grown to around 400 staff working in two 12-hour shifts. Roughly 80 of them were focused specifically on influencing the American political process.
Posing as “concerned American citizens”, they posted on Facebook, Twitter and YouTube on issues such as race relations, gun rights, immigration and, ultimately, the 2016 presidential election. When Special Counsel Robert Mueller unveiled the 2018 indictment against 13 Russian nationals and three affiliated companies, it was the first time the operation came into full view — exposing its real scale.
Shady ecosystem: how many networks are there really?
Storm-1516 is not a single network, although it is currently the most prominent and widely recognised. It specialises in videos featuring supposed whistle-blowers and pseudo-journalists. The typical output is a clip showing an unidentified individual on camera speaking in grave terms about a “document leak” or a “scandal”. Most of these actors are filmed in St Petersburg, but are presented as, for example, a “Hungarian citizen” or an “American veteran”. In some cases, even the faces are generated using artificial intelligence.
Storm-1679 is another structure producing pseudo-documentaries styled after American investigative films and presented as the work of non-existent “independent production companies”. Its best-known example is the fabricated documentary Olympics Has Fallen (2023), which mimicked a Netflix production, featured an AI-generated imitation of Tom Cruise’s voice-over, and included fake reviews attributed to The New York Times and the BBC.
Over time, Russian information influence operations have become increasingly sophisticated, moving well beyond often low-quality video content. One objective has been to undermine media literacy efforts that encourage audiences to verify original sources. Storm-1099 was behind the well-known Doppelganger operation, which involved cloning reputable news websites and using them to spread propaganda and disinformation. GRU-linked hackers created near-identical copies of legitimate media sites, using web addresses that closely resembled the originals and replicating their visual design, while replacing the content with material promoting Kremlin narratives. In Germany, for example, such clones were created for Der Spiegel and Bild, while in France similar copies appeared for Le Monde. Networks of fake profiles on X and Facebook then amplified links to these cloned sites, and many readers never realised they were consuming counterfeit content.
Two other examples are Ruza Flood and Volga Flood — networks of fake social media accounts that do not generate their own content, but instead amplify material produced by other influence operations. The FBI seized 32 domains linked to Ruza Flood in 2024 alone, yet the network had already shifted its content to new web addresses within days.
Ghostwriter is another operation directly linked to the GRU and active since 2017. Its core tactic involved hacking into websites and email accounts belonging to real individuals, then publishing fabricated material under their names. One of the most striking examples was a forged letter purportedly written by the commandant of the Polish War Studies Academy, calling on Polish military personnel to “resist the American occupation”. At the time, Polish authorities officially classified the incident as an information operation.
China: different approach, similar outcome
No discussion of large-scale information influence operations is complete without Beijing. China’s counterpart is known as Spamouflage, or Dragonbridge, and has been described by Meta as “the largest known covert influence operation” on social media. The campaign has been tracked since 2019, when it first emerged with the aim of discrediting Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement. Over time, its scope widened to include promoting Beijing’s narratives on the origins of COVID-19, targeting dissidents abroad, and seeking to deepen divisions within American society ahead of the 2022 and 2024 elections. In 2023, Meta and US federal prosecutors concluded that Spamouflage was run by a unit of China’s Ministry of Public Security known as the “912 Special Project Working Group”.
Paradoxically, China’s approach has generally proved less effective than Russia’s. Researchers describe Spamouflage as often “shouting into the void”: it produces vast volumes of content but generates limited organic engagement, largely because it prioritises scale over substance. Its accounts frequently misuse English idioms and often come across as artificial. Where the Internet Research Agency sought to imitate the American “soul”, Spamouflage operates more like an assembly line — more accounts, more posts, but without the nuanced understanding of audience sentiment that has often defined Russian influence operations.
AI era of information influence operations: easy to create, hard to detect
Until 2022–2023, disinformation networks still depended heavily on human labour. They needed content creators, people to boost engagement metrics, translators working across multiple languages, and administrators to run and coordinate accounts. The arrival of ChatGPT shifted that equation fundamentally. The cost of producing content fell sharply – a convincing AI-generated video featuring a supposed “whistle-blower” no longer required an actor or a director. At the same time, the barrier to entry for new actors dropped significantly. What was once largely the preserve of well-resourced states is now, in principle, within reach of almost anyone.
Last year, experts were already documenting the consequences of this shift. Research by NewsGuard, for instance, found that disinformation generated by Storm-1516 outperformed content produced by state-backed outlets RT and Sputnik. The same material has also contributed to the poisoning of AI models, which are increasingly used as a source of information.
The mechanism is relatively simple: a fabricated story appears on a fake website, gets indexed by search engines, and is then reproduced by an AI model in response to a user query. In this way, the narrative gains a veneer of verification, becoming a seemingly legitimate part of the public agenda and the wider information ecosystem.
Identifying problems in the creation and spread of this kind of content is extremely difficult. Each step in the chain, taken on its own, is legal and appears entirely legitimate. Yet the sequence of actions used to circulate these false narratives points clearly to a coordinated operation. Most social media platforms that try to tackle disinformation still tend to focus on individual pieces of content, rather than the influence networks behind them. In recent years, though, tech companies have begun paying closer attention to those networks themselves, particularly after the exposure of the Doppelganger operation.
A striking example of how these networks operate in Ukraine can be seen in the bot activity that has intensified on TikTok over the past year. Analysts at Texty.org.ua identified a bot farm of 629 accounts, known collectively as UA_REVIVAL, whose purpose was to discredit mobilisation efforts and erode trust in both the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the government. The videos follow a tightly repetitive format: sombre images or short clips set to music, paired with emotionally charged captions such as “Dad died at the conscription office” or “Zelensky betrayed the fallen heroes”. The accounts also rely heavily on hashtags — both political and entirely unrelated ones like #winter or #blackfriday — to maximise reach. Researchers estimated that false narratives relating to Ukraine’s Territorial Recruitment Centres (TCC) alone accumulated around 920,000 views.
Among the most common formats are both genuine and staged videos showing confrontations involving TCC personnel, fabricated clips designed to provoke negative sentiment towards military servicemen, and content produced by self-styled “TikTok lawyers” spreading misinformation about mobilisation rules. Other recurring themes include false claims about the mobilisation of teenagers and women. A separate category consists of fabricated “street interviews”, in which AI-generated “ordinary Ukrainians” describe the war as “pointless”, oppose mobilisation, and promote the narrative that there is no need to retake occupied territories.
Confronting disinformation hydra
Storm-1516, Doppelganger, Ghostwriter and similar networks have long operated as parts of a wider information influence ecosystem. They evolve quickly, scale fast, and constantly shift tactics and tools, making them exceptionally difficult to identify and dismantle.
Bloomberg has described Storm-1516 as one of the Kremlin’s most powerful information operations. But a more accurate framing may be that it is simply one of the few networks studied in sufficient detail. Undoubtedly, other, less visible structures are operating in parallel, built on the same principles and using the same technologies.
In practice, tackling this kind of informational damage has to look different. It can’t stop at flagging or removing individual pieces of disinformation. What’s needed is coordinated action from platforms and tech companies — from sharing signals on coordinated campaigns to building systems that can automatically detect network patterns and synthetic content — if it’s to have any real impact. As long as these systems remain fragmented, each new iteration of disinformation networks gains a built-in time advantage. That is why the key question today is not whether new “Storms” will emerge — they almost certainly already exist. The real question is how quickly they can be detected, and whether democratic societies can adapt to an environment in which the boundary between real and artificially generated content is becoming increasingly blurred.
Pentagon orders bases to plan for 90 days without the grid as Britain urges families to stockpile food and water
Story by Bilin Lin
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The Pentagon wants every major U.S. military base to run for 90 days without outside help if a war cuts off power and supply chains. Across the Atlantic, Britain is telling families to keep canned food, bottled water, and cash on hand to get through three days of disruption.
The two efforts aren’t known to be coordinated, and neither government has said a new war is imminent. But both are planning for disruptions that could leave homes and military installations without the services they depend on.
Inside the Pentagon’s 90-day plan
The Pentagon is developing a requirement that every major military installation in the continental U.S. be able to sustain essential operations on its own for at least 90 days, Fox News Digital reported Oct. 25, citing internal planning documents. The requirement falls under an initiative called FORTRESS, short for Federal Operations for Resilience, Troop Resources, Energy, Supply, and Survivability.
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth unveiled FORTRESS in his Sept. 30 “State of the Force” address. He pledged that every major installation would generate its own power, independent of the civilian grid. A follow-up memo laid out plans for a dedicated program office. The 90-day standard goes further than that original goal, extending self-sufficiency beyond electricity to water, fuel, and communications.
“Power is combat now,” Pentagon chief spokesperson Sean Parnell, who Fox said led the FORTRESS initiative, told the outlet. “Without electricity, you lose communications, water, logistics, assembly lines, and just basic military command structures.”
FORTRESS also calls for strategic reserves of munitions, fuel, critical minerals, electronics, spare parts, and medical supplies. For the military’s most critical dependencies, it would require at least two qualified supply or production pathways, so that losing a single factory or supplier wouldn’t halt operations.
Through the Civil Reserve Manufacturing Network, an existing program folded into FORTRESS, the Pentagon plans to identify commercial factories that could switch to defense production in a crisis. Technical specifications, cybersecurity protections, contracting arrangements, and conversion procedures would be worked out in advance.
The threat no one names out loud
The Pentagon hasn’t publicly identified a specific country as FORTRESS’s target. But in a February 2024 joint advisory, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, NSA, and FBI warned that Chinese state-sponsored hackers known as Volt Typhoon had compromised IT networks of U.S. organizations in the communications, energy, transportation, and water sectors. The agencies said the hackers were potentially positioning themselves to disrupt essential services during a future conflict. Microsoft first flagged the group’s activity in 2023.
The Pentagon hasn’t released a cost estimate or timeline. A senior defense official told reporters Oct. 20 that officials are still assessing the needs of roughly 500 bases in the continental U.S. and that fully meeting the goal could take decades, according to Air & Space Forces Magazine. The magazine estimated the cost could run into the tens of billions of dollars, if not hundreds of billions.
Britain tells families to prepare for three days without essential services
Details of the Pentagon plan emerged days after the British government launched its Be Ready campaign on Oct. 22.
The government’s checklist recommends three liters of drinking water per person per day. It also lists nonperishable food that needs no cooking or refrigeration, flashlights, power banks, first-aid supplies, a battery-powered or windup radio, and food and water for pets. Households are also encouraged to keep cash in case card payments and ATMs go down.
The government describes Be Ready as the first stage of a three-year campaign covering severe weather and other emergencies. Britain has published household preparedness guidance since May 2024, so the campaign isn’t a sudden signal that war is near.
“To prevent the worst, we have to prepare for it,” Streeting wrote. He pointed to threats from hostile states, cyberattacks, organized crime, and climate change, and argued that terms like “hybrid warfare” understate the danger.
Russia, China, and Iran are already probing British systems
The concerns aren’t new. Britain’s 2025 National Security Strategy named Russia the country’s most acute threat and flagged Iranian hostile activity. It also cast China as a sophisticated, persistent challenge and highlighted undersea cables, energy pipelines, and transportation networks as infrastructure to protect.
A July government resilience report pointed to new conflict in the Middle East, a growing number of sub-threshold attacks from Russia and several major cyberattacks.
Britain’s National Cyber Security Centre handled more than 200 cyber incidents affecting critical infrastructure and its supporting ecosystem between June 2025 and May 2026. NCSC chief executive Richard Horne said in June that about 75% of those incidents were believed to be linked to state actors, naming Russia, China, and Iran.
Britain isn’t alone
In March 2025, the European Commission unveiled a preparedness strategy calling for guidelines to help EU residents keep at least 72 hours of emergency supplies.
In the U.S., President Trump marked FEMA’s National Preparedness Month in September, an annual campaign dating to 2004, with a presidential message. He urged Americans to keep emergency kits, know their evacuation routes, and ready themselves for “natural and man-made threats.”
Emergency preparedness is nothing new. But the latest push comes as Western governments grow more worried about cyberattacks, sabotage, and other forms of hybrid warfare linked to Russia, China, and Iran. The next conflict may not start on a battlefield. It could start with the power going out.
The government has announced that it will impose higher taxes on banks in a bid to help public finances.
In today’s Budget, chancellor John Healey announced that he will increase the bank corporation tax surcharge from its current rate of 3% to 6% in January 2027.
This is lower than the 8% expected by economists and means it will not return to the level it was at prior to Jeremy Hunt lowering it in 2023.
Healey said: “As chancellor, I want to say directly to our banks: I celebrate and I am grateful for the role that you play.
“Amid the global economic storms, I am looking to our banks to help fund breathing space for British families.
“And so banks will pay an extra 3% on the bank surcharge. This will be time limited to pay for immediate support on energy bills, starting in January, ending 15 months later.
UK banks currently pay a combined corporation tax rate of 28%, composed of the standard 25% corporation tax plus a 3% surcharge.
The surcharge fell from 8% to 3% in April 2023, while corporation tax rose from 19% to 25%, taking the combined headline rate from 27% to 28%.
The measure could raise more than £1bn annually for the Treasury, but has prompted questions about the potential implications for lending activity and the availability of credit.
A higher bank surcharge will reach borrowers through squeezed margins, tighter lending criteria and fewer incentives, brokers told Newspage, although competition between lenders would limit how much they could pass on.
Brokers have warned that lenders could withdraw cashback, reduce fee-free offers or become more selective about applicants, leaving some borrowers with fewer options even if headline rates barely change.
John Barbour, senior director at banking and credit advisory consultancy Broadstone, commented: “Any increase in bank taxation could have knock-on implications for the availability and cost of credit if lenders respond by tightening lending criteria or becoming more selective about the borrowers they support. It could also accelerate the shift towards alternative and non-bank lenders, creating new challenges around regulatory oversight and the monitoring of credit risks across the market.”
Your bank might feel like the boring bit of your money life. It’s where your salary lands, your bills go out and your online shopping decisions happen.
But banks do far more than hold our money; they lend to companies, arrange finance and help businesses raise money. In other words, they help decide what gets built, expanded and protected.
The new Banking on Climate Chaos report has just landed, and it makes shocking reading. It finds that the world’s 65 biggest banks committed $906.4 billion (£676.5 billion) to fossil fuel companies in 2025, up 7.6 per cent on the previous year.
But for UK customers, the most revealing part is fossil fuel expansion.
Some banks may cut their overall fossil fuel finance, while still increasing finance to companies developing new oil, gas and coal projects.
What is fossil fuel expansion?
Fossil fuel expansion means companies developing new oil, gas or coal production, infrastructure or power projects.
So this isn’t only about banks financing fossil fuel companies that already exist, it’s about banks helping to fund the companies building more fossil fuel capacity now.
The report says bank finance for companies expanding fossil fuels rose to $508.4 billion (£379.5 billion) in 2025, up 27.1 per cent in a single year.
It says this kind of finance is incompatible with limiting global heating to 1.5°C, because new fossil fuel infrastructure can lock in emissions and dependency for years to come.
What are UK banks doing?
The UK picture is uncomfortable. Barclays is ranked eighth globally for fossil fuel finance in 2025, making it the highest-ranked British bank in the report’s main table. It provided $34.1 billion (£25.5 billion) in fossil fuel finance during the year.
Barclays reduced its overall fossil fuel finance by 5.3 per cent compared with 2024. But its finance to companies expanding fossil fuels rose 40.3 per cent.
HSBC and Standard Chartered both increased their overall fossil fuel finance in 2025. HSBC’s rose 16.2 per cent, while Standard Chartered’s rose 27.9 per cent.
Their fossil fuel expansion finance also rose sharply.UK bankFossil fuel finance in 2025Change vs 2024Fossil fuel expansion finance in 2025Change vs 2024Barclays$34.1bnDown 5.3%$17.6bnUp 40.3%HSBC$15.9bnUp 16.2%$8.7bnUp 36.2%Standard Chartered$14.4bnUp 27.9%$7.9bnUp 41.7%NatWest$2.5bnDown 4.9%$1.3bnUp 4.4%Lloyds Banking Group$1.7bnUp 37.0%$350mDown 60.0%
This is where ethical banking gets murky. A bank can have a net zero target and still finance fossil fuel companies. It can reduce total fossil fuel finance while increasing finance to companies expanding fossil fuels. It can talk about sustainability while continuing to back parts of the fossil fuel economy.
So the useful question isn’t only ‘does my bank have a climate policy?’, it’s ‘what does my bank still finance?’
Why should bank customers care?
Most of us didn’t choose our bank because of its fossil fuel policy. We chose it because our parents used it, because it had a branch nearby, because we opened an account as a student, or because switching felt like too much admin.
No one needs a guilt trip for having a high street bank account.
But banking is one of the easier ethical money choices to revisit. You don’t need to be wealthy, you don’t need to understand the stock market, and you don’t need to start investing.
You can simply ask whether your bank is using money in a way that broadly matches your values.
Climate change is already feeding through into everyday financial life, from insurance costs and food prices to energy bills, housing and long-term investment risk. Banks remain central to this because they help decide which companies can access finance, and on what terms.
Green claims aren’t enough
The report says the banking sector has now seen two consecutive years of increased fossil fuel finance and a third consecutive year of banks tending to backslide on climate policies.
It points to the collapse of the Net-Zero Banking Alliance in 2025 and says some banks have weakened commitments, widened loopholes or watered down policies for coal, oil and gas.
For customers, that means climate language needs to be treated carefully. Words such as “sustainable”, “responsible” and “net zero” are only useful if they’re backed by clear action. A stronger ethical bank should be able to show what it funds, what it excludes and how those policies work in practice.
The important thing to check is whether your bank has restrictions on fossil fuel expansion. A bank may say it’s supporting the energy transition while still financing companies developing new oil, gas or coal projects.
That’s the gap customers need to watch.
How UK banks compare globally
The report names JPMorgan Chase as the world’s largest fossil fuel financier in 2025, followed by Bank of America and Japan’s Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group.
Together, the 12 largest fossil fuel banks provided $474.3 billion (£354 billion) in finance in 2025. The report says this accounted for 38.5 per cent of all bank fossil fuel financing across its wider BOCC+ dataset.
Barclays is the only UK bank in this group.
That doesn’t mean other UK banks are off the hook. But it does show how concentrated fossil fuel finance is. A relatively small number of banks are driving a large share of global fossil fuel finance.
Which ethical banks does Good With Money recommend?
For readers who want a clearer ethical alternative, Good With Money regularly highlights banks and building societies that put social and environmental purpose closer to the centre of what they do.
Triodos Bank is one of the clearest options for personal banking. It offers current accounts, savings and ISAs, and says it only lends to organisations delivering positive social, environmental or cultural impact, including renewable energy, sustainable farming, charities and social housing. Triodos also holds Good With Money’s Good Egg mark.
Ecology Building Society is another Good Egg firm. It focuses on sustainable housing and green building, including mortgages that support energy-efficient homes, renovations, self-builds and community-led housing. It also offers savings accounts, so savers can choose a provider with a clear environmental focus.
Unity Trust Bank, also a Good Egg firm, isn’t a personal current account provider, but it’s a strong option for charities, social enterprises and purpose-led organisations. Its lending focuses on organisations creating positive social impact across the UK.
Other providers often cited in ethical banking discussions include Charity Bank, the Co-operative Bank, Coventry Building Society and Nationwide Building Society. The right choice will depend on what you need from an account, how much branch access matters to you, what rates are available and how far you want your money to go on ethics.
The key point is transparency. A good ethical bank shouldn’t leave you guessing what your money is helping to finance.
Should you switch bank?
If your bank is heavily involved in fossil fuel finance, and that doesn’t sit well with you, switching is worth considering.
You don’t have to move everything at once. You could start by moving your savings to a more ethical provider, opening an ethical account alongside your existing one, or switching your current account when you feel ready.
If switching isn’t practical right now, you can still act. Ask your bank what it’s doing to end finance for fossil fuel expansion. Move future savings or business banking to a provider with clearer ethical standards. Support campaigns calling for stronger fossil fuel finance rules.
Banks respond to money, pressure and reputation. Customer choices aren’t the whole answer, but they’re not meaningless either.
What can you do now?
Check whether your current bank appears in the Banking on Climate Chaos report.
If it does, look beyond the headline figure. Is its fossil fuel finance rising or falling? Is it still financing companies expanding oil, gas or coal?
Then compare alternatives. Look for clear lending policies, transparent reporting and evidence that the bank or building society is financing things you’re comfortable supporting.
The new Banking on Climate Chaos report shows fossil fuel finance is still flowing at vast scale. More importantly, it shows some banks are still helping to finance the next wave of fossil fuel expansion.
The hopeful bit is that your money doesn’t have to flow with it.
Aviation News – North American Aerospace Defense Command detected and tracked multiple Russian military aircraft operating inside the Alaskan Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) this week, underscoring renewed long-range patrol activity near North American airspace and prompting routine monitoring by U.S. and Canadian forces.
And
NATO maintains intensive surveillance amid Russian Arctic training and weapons testing
DUBAI- A Defense News investigation found evidence linking the Russian cargo airline Aviacon Zitotrans to more than 100 apparent missions conducted on behalf of the UAE government and its royal family since mid-2025. The investigation analyzed thousands of flight records, aviation filings, leaked company documents, and emails.
The airline has been sanctioned by the United States, Canada, and Ukraine for supporting Russia’s war effort. Several aircraft identified in the UAE-related flight records are separately designated as blocked property by the U.S. government.
Gravitas | US attack could trigger WW III: Russian planes in Tehran, Israeli jets, US warships in action
Story by Jatin Verma
As elections in Israel and America draw closer, tensions in West Asia are rising again. The USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier strike group, with 10,000 troops is heading towards the region. With Tehran too prepared for a large-scale retaliation, speculation is growing over the possibility of US and Israel striking Iran as early as this weekend. The first indication came earlier this week as US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth visited Israel and met Netanyahu on Monday. IDF reportedly simulated new strikes on Iran.
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According to reports, dozens of fighter jets flew more than 800 miles from Israel, passed through Syrian and Iraqi airspace and turned around at Iran’s border. This may also have been a bid to provoke Iran into firing on the jets, thereby creating pretext for an Israeli strike. According to reports, US and Israel are preparing to resume attacks on Iran even before the Israeli general election, scheduled on October 27.
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In another indication of impending hostilities, several Russian military aircraft have reportedly landed in Iran, as Moscow prepares to evacuate personnel from the Bushehr nuclear power plant. The first time Russia did so was on February 28, when the Iran war started. Amid heightened tensions, the US has ordered the departure of non-emergency employees and their families from Saudi Arabia and has also reportedly planned to withdraw staff from other missions in the region. Additionally, there has reportedly been a surge in the departure of wealthy expatriates, diplomats and members of royal families from West Asia in the last few days.
Iranian Russians are Russians living in Iran or Iranians of Russian descent. Russians populate various regions, but mostly in those regions which had been under direct Russian military occupation in the past. This was an indirect result of the outcome of the last Russo-Persian Wars.[1] Nowadays there are Russians located in the southern regions of the country as well (such as Bushehr), where many of them work as technicians and nuclear experts, on for example the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant.
Quick facts Regions with significant populations, Languages …
As the transatlantic allies adapt to Europe’s new geopolitical realities, maintaining unity against Russia will be critical. Türkiye will have a pivotal role to play in this long-term effort.
The Europe Program in Washington explores the political and security developments within Europe, transatlantic relations, and Europe’s global role. Working in coordination with Carnegie Europe in Brussels, the program brings together U.S. and European policymakers and experts on strategic issues facing Europe.
This paper is part of a series of four publications in a project run by the Carnegie Endowment’s Türkiye and the World Initiative, analyzing the forces at play in the Euro-Atlantic area since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The project examines the European Union’s geopolitical evolution, Türkiye’s relations with Russia and China, and European and Turkish aspirations for strategic autonomy, and draws conclusions for the United States and the transatlantic partnership.
During the Cold War, Türkiye presented itself as the steadfast guardian of Europe’s southern flank against the Soviet threat. It stood in lockstep with its Western allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and few, if any, questioned Ankara’s foreign policy trajectory or its commitment to NATO.
But this once firm conviction has weakened in the past decade. Türkiye’s deepening entanglement with Russia and setbacks in its relations with the United States and some of its European allies have muddled the country’s image as a staunch member of the Western security architecture.
Ankara’s ability to maintain a constructive dialogue with Moscow (alongside Kyiv) even after Russia’s attack against Ukraine has been beneficial in some cases, as evidenced by Türkiye’s role in the 2022 grain deal and the complex prisoner swap that freed numerous Western hostages including Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich.1 These ties could also be helpful in the future for peacemaking efforts and post-conflict scenarios in Ukraine.
However, as a longtime NATO member, Türkiye’s recent hedging has created an impression of dissent within the Western front against Russian aggression. As the transatlantic allies adapt to Europe’s new geopolitical realities, maintaining unity against Russia will be critical. Türkiye will have a pivotal role to play in this long-term effort.
This paper aims to explain the drivers and complexities behind Russian-Turkish convergences while considering their implications for Euro-Atlantic security. It examines the deepening engagement of the two countries in the security and energy domains, analyzes their strengths and weaknesses, and offers ideas on a way forward that would contribute to Euro-Atlantic security by safeguarding both Türkiye’s and its NATO allies’ long-term interests.
Russian diesel returns to Turkey and Brazil after Trump deal
At least two tankers have already set sail for traditional buyers of Russian fuel. Moscow lifts export ban after deal between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin
Ibrahim Kalın, director of Türkiye’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT), will join officials from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, Ankara’s partners in the Mecca Defense Alliance, in a visit to Tehran, an Iranian official said on Monday. Turkish sources speaking to Anadolu Agency (AA) also confirmed the participation of Kalın to the talks, which, according to Iranian media outlets, will be held on Monday. The talks will focus on “regional security.”
“As agreed, Saudi Defence Minister Khalid bin Salman, Pakistani army chief General Asim Munir and Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalın will participate in this meeting,” said Ali Bagheri Kani, deputy secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. He said the meeting will be held with Iran’s security chief Mohsen Rezaei.
“This four-party meeting in Tehran could represent an important and effective step towards building lasting regional security, and we hope this initiative will contribute to establishing a stable region,” said Kani in an interview with state television, without elaborating.
He said that the meeting was proposed during a visit by Pakistani army chief Asim Munir to Tehran last week.
The Israeli prime minister faced opposition from Lt Gen Eyal Zamir, Israel’s military chief, who believed an attack could prompt Tehran to retaliate, three Israeli defence officials told the New York Times.
After nearly two decades in office, the Israel’s longest-serving prime minister is facing one of the biggest political challenges of his career on Tuesday.
The national elections are the first since the Oct 7, 2023 attacks by Hamas, and Mr Netanyahu, who is behind in the polls, has tied his re-election to the survival of Israel.
Although Lt Gen Zamir was not opposed to an attack on Iran per se, he reportedly objected to the timing coinciding with the elections and said there was no immediate need to restart the conflict, the officials said.
He and Maj Gen Omer Tischler, the commander of the Israeli air force, apparently cited “political sensitivities”, The New York Times reported.
Lt Gen Eyal Zamir, the Israeli military chief, was opposed to the timing of the strike Credit: Reuters/Amir Cohen
Mr Netanyahu has not said publicly why he was pushing for renewed strikes on Iran but a return to war could have delayed the election.
Reports in Israeli media claimed that he would dismiss Lt Gen Zamir if he received a mandate to form the next government.
In his final interview before the election, the Israeli prime minister admitted that his Likud party could face defeat, telling Channel 14 that “it’s not in our pocket and it’s not a lost cause”.
Arab parties:
Ra’am: Mansour Abbas’s pragmatic approach
Ra’am, or the United Arab List, is an Islamist-conservative party led by Mansour Abbas. It advocates better public services and economic opportunities for Arab communities, alongside recognition of Arab citizens’ collective rights.
Its priorities include tackling organised crime, improving housing and infrastructure, narrowing educational inequalities and securing greater resources for Arab municipalities. The party also supports Palestinian statehood, an end to the occupation and the dismantling of Israeli settlements.
Abbas has pursued a pragmatic approach to coalition politics, arguing that Arab lawmakers can secure tangible benefits by negotiating with Israeli governments rather than remaining permanently outside them. In 2021, Ra’am became the first independent Arab party to join an Israeli governing coalition, supporting the government led by Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid.
For this election, Ra’am’s strategy has centred on presenting itself as a potential negotiating partner. Its list also includes former Israeli deputy public security minister Yoav Segalovitz, a Jewish politician who previously belonged to the centrist Yesh Atid party
Who are Israel’s Arab parties, what they want, why they matter
Story by Raunaq Lekhi
• 10h
Who are Israel’s Arab parties, what they want, why they matter
New Delhi: Israel’s Arab parties could emerge as pivotal players in the country’s first general election since the Hamas-led 7 October 2023 attack. Exit polls released on 28 October project that Palestinian parties could win as many as 19 seats in the 120-member Knesset. Neither the bloc led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu nor the opposition grouping led by Gadi Eisenkot is projected to secure the 61 seats required for a majority. The official results are still awaited.
The result could give Arab lawmakers greater leverage in negotiations over the next government. But Israel’s Arab parties are not a unified political force. While they share concerns about discrimination, crime and the treatment of Palestinians, they differ over ideology and how far they should cooperate with predominantly Jewish parties to influence government policy.
‘Go home, Ben-Gvir’; Arab bloc celebrates record turnout in Israel elections
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Who are Israel’s Arab parties?
Arab citizens make up roughly a fifth of Israel’s population. They can vote in national elections and elect representatives to the Knesset, although they have long faced inequalities in areas such as housing, public services and municipal funding.
The main Arab political forces contesting the 2026 election are Mansour Abbas’s Ra’am and the Joint List, an alliance comprising Hadash, Ta’al and Balad. The two are pursuing different approaches to political influence.
Ra’am, or the United Arab List, is an Islamist-conservative party led by Mansour Abbas. It advocates better public services and economic opportunities for Arab communities, alongside recognition of Arab citizens’ collective rights.
Its priorities include tackling organised crime, improving housing and infrastructure, narrowing educational inequalities and securing greater resources for Arab municipalities. The party also supports Palestinian statehood, an end to the occupation and the dismantling of Israeli settlements.
Abbas has pursued a pragmatic approach to coalition politics, arguing that Arab lawmakers can secure tangible benefits by negotiating with Israeli governments rather than remaining permanently outside them. In 2021, Ra’am became the first independent Arab party to join an Israeli governing coalition, supporting the government led by Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid.
For this election, Ra’am’s strategy has centred on presenting itself as a potential negotiating partner. Its list also includes former Israeli deputy public security minister Yoav Segalovitz, a Jewish politician who previously belonged to the centrist Yesh Atid party.
The Joint List: Hadash, Ta’al and Balad
The Joint List brings together three parties with different political traditions.
Hadash, associated with the Jewish-Arab left, emphasises equality, social justice, workers’ rights and cooperation between Jewish and Arab citizens. Ofer Cassif is among its prominent representatives.
Ta’al, founded by Ahmad Tibi, combines Palestinian national advocacy with participation in Israeli parliamentary politics. Tibi is one of the most recognisable Arab lawmakers in Israel.
Balad, led by Sami Abu Shehadeh, advances an Arab-nationalist and democratic vision, calling for Israel to become a state of all its citizens rather than one that privileges Jewish national identity. Abu Shehadeh withdrew from the Joint List’s candidate slate in October, although he remains Balad’s chairman.
Yousef Jabareen and Ahmad Tibi head the Joint List’s filed electoral slate. The alliance supports Palestinian statehood, opposition to the occupation, civil equality and stronger protections for minority rights.
SERBIA’S pro-Russian leader Aleksandar Vucic has conceded defeat in the national election – marking a massive blow for Vladimir Putin.
The fiercely contested vote saw strongman Vucic’s 12-year reign as Serbian president with the election result set to weaken Moscow’s control over the Balkan region.
Brazil’s Lula wins reelection with victory over Trump ally Bolsonaro, who rejects result
By Alessandra Freitas
CNNOctober 26, 2026
Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was reelected to a historic fourth term Sunday, but his defeated rival and Trump ally Senator Flávio Bolsonaro said he would not accept the results and would mount a legal challenge.
The 80-year-old leftist leader won more than 51 percent of votes, securing a runoff victory that bucks a broader rightward political shift across Latin America and comes after a campaign dominated by concerns over the cost of living, crime and corruption.
Bolsonaro, who trailed Lula by about 4.4 million votes, said his team would challenge the result after the Supreme Court’s last-minute ruling to extend voting by two hours.
“It is impossible to recognize the election result given how these events unfolded,” Bolsonaro told supporters in the capital Brasilia after Lula’s victory was declared.
“We will take legal action. We will ask for this election to be annulled.”
The vote marks the first time since the return of direct presidential elections in 1989 that a candidate has won the presidency after finishing second in the first round.
“I can assure you that we are going to change the way we govern this country. We are going to give the people a greater role in our decisions,” Lula said after his reelection.
Lula thanked the Brazilian people for their “generosity,” especially the country’s youth who “took to the streets to defend democracy.”
And Bolsonaro flees:
Lula Says Bolsonaro Family’s ‘First Homeland Is Licking US Boots’ as Flávio Flees to America After Brazil Election Defeat
‘Metrópoles’ reported Flávio Bolsonaro was headed to Florida and might seek asylum
ByRegyl Jaen Published 28 October 2026, 10:38 AM GMT
Something bizarre just happened. Something that proves independent journalism is doing what the corporate press refuses to do.
A couple of weeks ago, Closer to the Edge published an article calling out CNN, MSNBC, The New York Times, The Washington Post, and every other major news outlet for ignoring what should be one of the biggest geopolitical bombshells in modern history:
Alnur Mussayev, former head of Kazakhstan’s intelligence service, claimed that Donald Trump has been a Russian asset since 1987 —operating under the KGB codename “Krasnov.”
………
It didn’t start in Moscow.
It started in New York — in 1986 — when Donald Trump was first approached by Soviet operatives posing as business representatives. According to Yuri Shvets, a former KGB officer stationed in Washington during the Cold War, Trump was identified as a potential asset and cultivated through soft power: flattery, promises of fame, and the prospect of doing business in the USSR.
A year later, in 1987, Trump would fly to Moscow under the watchful guidance of Intourist, the Soviet government’s travel agency and a known KGB front. That trip, Shvets claims, was a “textbook active measure.” Trump was paraded around, given VIP treatment, and gently encouraged to consider a future in politics.
He returned home weeks later and took out full-page ads in American newspapers criticizing U.S. foreign policy and NATO spending — almost verbatim what Soviet officials had wanted. Shvets believes that moment marked the beginning of Trump’s role as a Kremlin asset.
The liquefaction facility, located in Nikiski, will process, store, and transport up to 20 million tons of LNG per year. Illustration courtesy Alaska Gasline Development Corporation
See President Trump meet Vladimir Putin at US military base in Alaska
Aug. 16, 2025
And back in March of this year:
Planned LNG plant in Alaska seeks equipment from sanctioned Russia firm
March 30, 202610:26 PM GMT+1Updated March 31, 2026
WASHINGTON, March 30 (Reuters) – The head of Polar LNG, a company that plans to build a liquefied natural gas plant on Alaska’s North Slope, said his company is hoping to buy discounted equipment from a Russian project on which Washington has imposed sanctions.
Polar LNG launched on Monday. Joel Riddle, its president and CEO, in an interview said the company wants to make a final investment decision on its plant in mid-2027 and start producing LNG in 2029 or 2030.
Polar LNG is hoping to get approval from the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control to buy the equipment, including a partially built liquefaction plant, from Arctic LNG 2. The administrations of former President Joe Biden and President Donald Trump have both imposed sanctions on the project. The U.S. Treasury Department had no comment. Novatek (NVTK.MM), opens new tab, which owns about 60% of Arctic LNG 2, said it was aware of Polar LNG’s interest in its production technology. “Working-level discussions on possible engagement options are currently underway,” Novatek said.
The first phase of the project will take $8 billion to $9 billion in investments to produce 7 million tons a year of the fuel that could be sold to Japan, South Korea and other countries. The plant could be expanded in one or two more phases that would require similar investments.
Gentry Beach, a friend of Donald Trump Jr, is one investor in the project, Riddle said. Beach did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Polar LNG wants to finance more than half of the project with U.S. capital, but is open to investments from companies in Japan and other countries.
The project would collaborate with another project called Alaska LNG that the Trump administration is hoping will be built in coming years.
The North Slope is subject to severe weather and impacts from climate change that have driven some energy companies from the region. Riddle said the equipment the company seeks to buy is Arctic tested. The company also plans to buy six icebreakers.
A group of American executives has quit an energy startup that aspired to liquefy and export natural gas out of Alaska, alleging they recently learned it was secretly being funded by Russian gas giant Novatek.
Polar LNG, the startup, was launched in March with what seemed like a long-shot goal. The U.S. company wanted to get a license to import a half-finished piece of equipment from the Russian company, with the goal of exporting a geyser of gas from beneath Alaska’s North Slope.
The massive structure—as tall as the Statue of Liberty and suitable for frigid conditions—had fallen under sanctions during the Biden administration in response to Russia’s war on Ukraine. But Polar hoped its project would find favor with the Trump administration’s goal of “energy dominance” for America.
The sanctions also meant the equipment was available at a knockdown price, people involved in the project said. Securing it would mean Polar wouldn’t have to build its own from scratch.
Then the plans hit a snag: It turned out the project was being run and at least partly funded by Russian energy company Novatek, former Polar executives said. Joel Riddle, Polar’s CEO until September and a former ExxonMobil employee, says he resigned after the discovery, which he said emerged in budget discussions over the summer.
“I felt uncomfortable that the Russian company Novatek was financing and ultimately controlling the strategic direction of the company,” Riddle said.
Other executives left with Riddle. Their departures and the alleged Russian funding were earlier reported by the Financial Times and the New York Times.
Novatek didn’t respond to a request for comment. The White House, the Treasury Department and the State Department didn’t return calls for comment.
Novatek isn’t sanctioned by the U.S., and Europe has continued to buy its LNG since the invasion of Ukraine. Unlike many other Russian companies, Novatek has continued to have a presence in the U.S. and in European capitals during the war, paying lobbyists and elite law firms to try to influence sanctions and energy policy.
Polar’s project required convincing the Treasury Department to give it a license to buy the infrastructure from a sanctioned entity, Novatek’s Arctic LNG 2 business. It hasn’t received the go-ahead.
Two former Polar executives said high-ranking officials at the company shared concerns about Novatek’s role with the administration around early September and that government officials expressed concern.
Polar would have to import the gear from Russia by tugboat. Then, there was the issue of building the project on Alaska’s North Slope, dredging an enormous amount of seabed and securing icebreaker tankers to chart paths in the Arctic.
Monetizing the gas beneath Alaska has been a long-held ambition of many American energy executives. But the gas remains underdeveloped because shuttling it to domestic markets via pipeline would be costly and logistically daunting, as would liquefying it and shipping it internationally from where it is produced.
Russia, meanwhile, has poured resources into liquefied natural gas, and Novatek emerged as its national champion. The company is one of the few major energy producers that remain in private hands after a quarter-century of rule by President Vladimir Putin.
Novatek was partway through building a new export facility named Arctic LNG 2 in 2023 when the Biden administration sanctioned the project. The sanctions threw sand in the gears, stopping the project from importing parts from overseas.
A Norwegian executive at Novatek named Bjorn Gundersen, who is credited with having developed the technology used at Arctic LNG 2, left for Tech Wave, an engineering firm in Abu Dhabi, according to people familiar with the matter.
Tech Wave owned Polar and provided most of Polar’s capital. But in discussions over new, much-needed funding over the summer, it became clear that senior Novatek executives were really calling the shots and allocating capital, Riddle said.
Gundersen didn’t respond to a request for comment.
Around the same time, the sanctions bill named after late Sen. Lindsey Graham was making its way through Congress and threatened to make it even harder for Polar to get permission to transact with Novatek.
Polar executives had lobbied the White House and President Trump’s National Energy Dominance Council to get the go-ahead from the Treasury Department, said people familiar with their efforts. As of last month, there weren’t signs the efforts had momentum, according to the people and Riddle’s resignation letter, which The Wall Street Journal reviewed.
Former CEO: Russian Firm Backed Alaska Gas Venture
By Newsmax Wires | Saturday, 24 October 2026 02:43 PM EDT
Joel Riddle, former chief executive of Polar Train LNG, told the Financial Times he resigned in September after discovering what he described as undisclosed Russian involvement in the proposed liquefied natural gas export terminal on Alaska’s North Slope.
“I resigned as chief executive of Polar LNG because I felt uncomfortable that the Russian company Novatek was financing and ultimately controlling the strategic direction of the company,” Riddle told the newspaper.
“Building an LNG facility in Alaska is a very strategic project for the US and as a patriot I feel this needs to be developed using US technology and funded by US investors, not a Russian company.”
Polar LNG disputed his allegations, calling Riddle a “disgruntled employee” who was terminated. The company maintained that its operations comply with U.S. law.
“Development activities are being pursued in full compliance with applicable US laws,” the company told the Financial Times.
Bjørn Gundersen, Deputy Director of Novatek’s LNG Projects, refuses to speak with journalists. Archive photo by Thomas Nilsen
Bjørn Gundersen is Deputy Director of Novatek’s LNG Projects Department and plays a key role in the company’s grand development of the Arctic LNG 2, one of the biggest energy projects in the Arctic ever. He spoke in this Thursday’s Neighbor Conference in Kirkenes, Norway.
The event was open for the public. It was organized in connection with this week’s 75 year commemorations of Soviet liberation of Kirkenes.
About 15,000 people will have their jobs in the Arctic LNG 2, and Murmansk will become among the world’s leading centers for building of oil and gas facilities and platforms, Gundersen said and highlighted that «this is now in the making.»
The company representative is responsible for the development of the Kola Yard, the plant for construction of floating LNG platforms for the Arctic LNG 2.
About 10,000 people are now involved in the building works at Belokamenka, a few kilometers from Murmansk, Gundersen said. The three platforms to be built on site are combined three times bigger than the largest offshore installation ever built in the North Sea, he made clear. The construction of first of the platforms started in June this year.
According to Gundersen, he might be the only Norwegian working in Novatek, but there are a number of Norwegian companies involved as subcontractors in the Arctic LNG 2 project. Among them are Dr Techn. Olav Olsen, Concrete Structures, Trelleborg, IKM, Tschudi Shipping and more.
Bjørn Gundersen was very clear that he foresees a stronger future involvement of Norwegian companies in the LNG project. «After all, Kirkenes is only 250 kilometers from Murmansk and it would be tragic if we do not manage to succeed with cooperation,» he told the audience in Kirkenes.
Novatek’s projects in the Arctic have wide-reaching implications for local societies, economy and environment. But Bjørn Gundersen and Novatek are highly reluctant to share their views with the public.
When requested to respond to a question about Novatek’s activities in Murmansk, the company representative abruptly rejected.
«I can not take any questions from the Barents Observer, nor from any other media» he underlined and referred to the company press department.
The questions were subsequently forwarded to Novatek’s press departments.
No response from the company’s Moscow office had come by the time of publishing this report.
Russian natural gas company says it will abandon Norway
As an Arctic storm rages along Barents Sea coast, company Novatek signals that it will move its large-scale reloading of LNG away from Norwegian waters.
WASHINGTON—President Trump said he asked the Justice Department to sue Alaska to prevent certification of the state’s Senate results if the Republican candidate loses, an extraordinary move by his administration to intervene legally in the 2026 midterm elections.
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